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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
step away from legislation burdened with such difficult problems of
constitutionality and policy is commendable.
BROWN HILL BOSWELL
Administrative Law-judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in
Student Disciplinary Proceedings
In the recent case of lit re Carter,1 the petitioner, having been
suspended from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on
a charge of cheating on a quiz, appealed to the state courts for
judicial review. The trial court ruled that the evidence offered
against the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of innocence,
that the conviction was therefore not in accordance with due process,
and that to deny petitioner readmission on the evidence presented
would be arbitrary and capricious. But because additional evidence
had been disclosed at the trial, the court remanded the case to the
Board of Trustees to refer to the proper administrative authorities
for a review taking account of the new evidence. Petitioner took
no exception to this order and made no appeal, but moved before
a, subsequent term of court that an order be issued to the Board of
Trustees to show cause why an order should not be issued reversing
the suspension and directing correction of University records ac-
cordingly. It was held that until the administrative hearing on
remand was held, petitioner had not exhausted her administrative
remedies; the motion and order to show cause were dismissed.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal. Delegation of authority by the Board of Trustees in
matters of student suspension was upheld as "proper and constitu-
tional.' ' 2 The decision of the Board of Trustees upholding the stu-
dent honor council and the Chancellor was held to be "the admin-
istrative decision of a State board authorized by the Constitution
and statutes of the State to make administrative decisions . . . "a
and the petitioner was thus held to be entitled to judicial review
under the state statutes4 granting review of administrative decisions.
The Carter case thus establishes beyond doubt the jurisdiction of the
1262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).
Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 158.
*Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 159.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 to -316 (1953).
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North Carolina courts to exercise judicial review of student suspen-
sions from the University.
Courts have long acknowledged jurisdiction over suits challeng-
ing expulsion of students from colleges and universities.5 Yet, the
basis for their jurisdiction has seldom been clearly articulated, In
cases involving private schools, the courts have frequently held the
student-school relationship to rest in contract,' thus implicitly found-
ing their jurisdiction on the power to determine disputed contractual
rights. Where state schools are involved, jurisdiction may be based,
as in the Carter case, on state statutes granting authority to admin-
istrative boards and officers and establishing powers of review.
7
Until recently it was thought that the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution did not apply to cases of student disci-
pline. The only case that had specifically considered the question of
due process under the fourteenth amendment had denied its appli-
cability to student disciplinary proceedings in a state-supported insti-
tution.8 - Two recent federal cases, however, specifically grounded
federal jurisdiction in cases of student expulsion from state colleges
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 By its
terms the fourteenth amendment applies only where state action is
involved, and the state action requirement has been applied in the.
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589
(1909); People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun
107, 14 N.Y. Supp. 490, aff'd vere., 128 N.Y. 621 (1891); Commonwealth
ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). Contra, Carr v. St.
John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v.
Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y. Supp. 349 (1921) ; Barker
v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Ati. 220 (1923). In
Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960), the majority opinion was that there was no
federal jurisdiction over such cases where state schools are involved. The
concurring judge and the dissenting judge thought the requisite jurisdic-
tion was present. See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 903 (1958); Annot.,
50 A.L.R. 1497 (1927); Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1019 (1925).
See, e.g., Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, supra note 5; Peo-
ple ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, supra note 5.
" See also State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433,
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
' State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). In Steir v. New York State Educ.
Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966
(1960), the dissenting judge thought federal courts had jurisdiction of such
cases under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
'Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), reversing 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
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area of college education. 10 The distinction between public and pri-
vate educational institutions, so far as application of the due process
clause is concerned, may not be made in the future, however, since
recent cases have demonstrated a tendency to find state action in the
activities of many groups once thought to be private."
Despite their acknowledgment of jurisdiction over cases of stu-
dent discipline, the courts have generally expressed reluctance to
alter the institution's decision, whether the school be public' - or
private.'3 The usual statement is to the effect that the courts will
not interfere in the absence of an arbitrary or unusual act or abuse:
of discretion.' 4 While this exercise of judicial restraint is commend-
able when dealing with academic areas in which the courts have
no expertise,'" and while the determination of educational policy
per 'se is the legitimate concern of the institution and not of the
" See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ. of La., 212 F.
Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
"See Comment, 42 T~xAs L. Rxv. 344, 345-49 (1964), and cases cited
therein. The writer there concludes that by analogy to the development in
other areas where the services in question were impressed with a deep
public interest it is entirely possible that the activities of the private col-
leges and universities will be held to fall within the limits of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 347-48. See also Williams, The Twilight of State Action,
41 TExAs L. REv. 347, 379-80 (1963).
12 See, e.g., Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913); Woods
v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 At. 882, 883 (1924); Gleason v. Uni-
versity of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 362-63, 116 N.W. 650, 652 (1908); Ver-
million v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 112-13, 110 N.W. 736, 738 (1907); People
ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 68 Hun 118, 121-22, 22 N.Y.
Supp. 663, 665 (1893) ; State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 113,
171 S.W.2d 822, 827-28 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); Foley
v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 200, 55 S.W.2d 805, 810 (1932).
13 See, e.g., DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D.C.
Mass. 1957); Kentucky Military Institute v. ,Bramblet, 158 Ky. 205, 164
S.W. 808 (1914); People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186
(1866); Anthony v. -Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp.
435, 439-40 (1928).
"Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. Zd 442, 444 (Fla. App.
1958); Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 Atl. 882, 883 (1924);
Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 248, 197 N.W. 510, 511 (1924);
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216, 263 Pac. 433, 437, cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928); Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 112-13, 110
N.W. 736, 738 (1907); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 200, 55 S.W.2d
805, 810 (1932)1
"We find it to be the unanimous holding of the authorities that the courts
will not interfere with the discretion of school officials in matters affecting
discipline of students unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion or where
their action has been unlawful or arbitrary." State ex rel. Sherman v.
Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 113, 171 S.W.2d 822, 827-28 (1942).
15 See, e.g., Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932).
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
courts, a more stringent application of judicial review seems appro-
priate in the area of student disciplinary proceedings."0 In the field
of punitive discipline it is the court rather than the school that has
a special expertise.17 Evaluating facts to determine whether crime
has occurred is the normal function of the courts.' 8 If the institu-
tion's decision is based on specific incidents, rather than on its total
experience with the student, the court is as qualified to review this
decision as it is those of a trial judge or jury.19
Moreover, adequate protection of the student's interests may
necessitate a more rigorous exercise of judicial review, for in dis-
ciplinary matters the college is virtually judge in its own cause and
thus acts substantially unrestrained by outside pressures.20 Legisla-
tive solutions guarding the student's interests are scarcely to be
expected, since the institution has established channels of contact
with the legislature while the political influence of students is com--
paratively quite small.2 ' Further, the objection that judicial review
will result in a rash of suits seems untenable, since the number of
students willing and able to bear the expense and publicity of litiga-
tion is likely to remain small.22
It is to be expected, however, that growing enrollments and the
augmentation in value of education in modem society will result in
some increase in adjudications stemming from student disciplinary
proceedings. That the subject of student rights in college discipli-
nary proceedings has acquired increasing significance in recent years
is reflected in the work of both courts and commentators.2" This
is scarcely surprising when viewed in light of the current value of
education. A college diploma has become a virtual prerequisite to
1 See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1387-95 (1963).
1" Id. at 1393.'8 Id. at 1394.
'oId. at 1393.°Id. at 1388-89, 1394. See also authorities cited note 11 supra.
"Id. at 1390.
Ibid.
"E.g., BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW (1961) ; Jacobson, The Expulsion of
Students and Due Process of Law-The Right to Judicial Review, 34 J.
HXGHE ED. 250 (1963); Seavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70
HAR V. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and
State Universities, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 368 (1963); Comment, The Con-
stitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAs L. Rv. 344 (1964); Note,
The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 438; Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Annot., 58
A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
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success;' -petfiftiary and 'otherwise. When a' student is expelled,
barriers are frequently placed in his way which effectively prevent
his continuing his education elsewhere. The expelled student "suf-
fdr the lots of a status and the destruction of a set of relation-
ships' which have unique intrinsic worth."24 When viewed in this
context, the propriety of a stricter judicial review is accentuated.20
The necessity of a stricter judicial review is further demon-
strated by the total absence of procedural due process accorded to
students in many of the recorded cases. It has been held that fair
and reasonable notice to the student of the charges against him is
not required.26 Several cases hold that no hearing at all is neces-
sary,27 while others have found various forms of informal proceed-
' Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1364 (1963).-5 t has been urged that the courts may not inquire into a complaint
on'the part of a student that he has suffered unmerited injuries at
the hands of his instructors, so long as the latter aver them to have
been disciplinary in character. This is a grave proposition when it
is considered that there are tens of thousands of youth continually
in attendance at colleges, many of whom are of mature age and
any of whom may suffer degradation and irreparable injury to
reputation as well as pecuniary loss, by the unjust action of a facul-
ty. - -
It can never be safely admitted that the rights of so large and
mostly so worthy a body of our citizens, in whose welfare society
has such a deep and abiding interest, shall be utterly deprived in this
respect of the protection of the, law through its ordinary tribunals.
Comm onwealth ex .el' Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 86 (1887).
Dismissal from college affects a student's life too drastically to
be left to even the barest possibility of arbitrary action by college
administrators. Expulsion carries with it an ineradicable stigma
which usually prevents admission to another institution, with the
result that a student's chances for higher education may be gone
forever. This is much too high a price to pay for a threadbare legal
doctrine that blocks judicial review.
Jacobson, supra note 23, at 254-55.
" Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928). Contra,
Geiger v. Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944);
Commonwealtli ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
' DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D.C. Mass. 1957);
People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d
6.35-,(,1956); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913); White
v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162, 174 N.E. 187 (1931); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928); Goldstein
v. NewYork Univ.; 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902). In DeHaan
v. Brandeis Univ., supra at 627, the court said, "While it might be a better
pblicy to hold a hearing whenever any disciplinary action is contemplated,
I hold as a iatter of law that the defendant is not required to do so."
Cbntra, Knight y. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904); Gleason
v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908); Geiger v.
[vol.43
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ings to be sufficient. 2s The right of the accused "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him' 29 has often been-denied in college
disciplinary proceedings. It has been said that since honorable stu-
dents do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against
their fellow students, they should not be subjected to cross-examina-
tion."0 Further, although the right to be represented by counsel is
now regarded as an essential element of our system of criminal
justice,31 no authority specifically holds accused students entitled
to representation by counsel in disciplinary proceedings. 2 The want
of procedural due process in a case of expulsion from a state uni-
versity33 provoked one commentator to remark, "our sense of justice
should be outraged by denial to students of the normal safeguards.
... It is... shocking to find that a court supports [college officials]
, . . in denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket."3 4
Standing in sharp contrast to these cases is the model for pro-
cedural due process set forth in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education,"5 the first case to hold that due process requires notice
Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944); Common-
wealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). In Knight. v.
State Bd. of Educ., supra at 178, the court felt that
the rudiments of fair play and the requirements of due process
vested in the plaintiffs the right to be forewarned or advised of the
charges to be made against them and to be afforded an opportunity
to present their side of the case before such drastic disciplinary
action was invoked by the university authorities.
" State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App. 24 (1890) ; State ex rel.
Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591
(1928) (meeting with deans' council); Miller v. Clement, 205 Pa. 484, 55
Atl. 32 (1903) (hearing before committee of board, reviewed by full board);
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943) (dean stated substance of' testimony
against relators to faculty committee)..'See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
"' State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 110, 171 S.W.2d 822,
826 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). See also Morrison v. City
of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E. 400 (1902); State ex rel. Ingersoll v.
Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928). In
Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960), the concurring judge seemed contemptuous
of the idea of requiring cross-examination.
' See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Geiger v. Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647, 652
(1944), stated obiter dictum that the right to be represented by counsel if
the student so elects is an essential element of a proper hearing.
8 'People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635- (1956).
8, Seavey, supra note 23, at 1406-07.
"294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962). The
case has been noted extensively: 14 ALA. L. Rnv. 126 (1961); 50 GEo. L.J.
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and some opportunity to be heard before a student at a tax-sup-
ported college may be expelled for misconduct. The court there
stated that notice to the student should "contain a statement of the
specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify ex-
pulsion... ."I' A hearing should be held which allows presentation
of both sides of the case in considerable detail.8 7 While cross-
examination is not required, the student should be given the names
of the witnesses against him and a report on the facts to which
each testifies3 He should then be given the opportunity to present
his own defense against the charges and to produce oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf." These rudiments
of an adversary proceeding, the court concluded, may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college.
40
All the procedural safeguards of the Dixon model, and more,
are incorporated into the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill system of student discipline, which was at issue in the Carter
case. North Carolina, both on the state and administrative levels,
seems to grant to the student the right to due process. On the state
level, the statute on which the court in Carter based its right to
review provides that the courts may reverse or modify the decision
of an administrative agency on the ground, inter alia, that it is in
violation of constitutional provisions.41 The State Constitution pro-
vides that no person ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, "but by the law of the land." 42 The "law of the land"
is equivalent to "due process of law."'43 On the administrative level,
the Board of Trustees, as the body entrusted with the management
of the University," has delegated to the faculty and Chancellor the
duty of securing to every student the right of due process and a
fair hearing.' Various provisions of the Student Constitution and
314 (1961); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (1962); 60 MxcH. L. Rxv. 499 (1962);
38 N.D.L. Rxv. 346 (1962); 35 TEMP. L.Q. 437 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REV.
1005 (1962).
88 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 35, at 158.




xN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1953).
N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
"State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) ; State v. Collins,
169 N.C. 323, 84 S.E. 1049 (1915).
"N.C. GEr. STAT. § 116-10 (1960).'nAmong the duties of the faculty and Chancellor in each of the
[Vol. 43
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the Student Judicial Procedures Bill48 effectuate this delegation of
authority.
4 7
"Due notice" is guaranteed the student and is defined as notice
"seventy-two hours preceding a hearing. 4 . Notice is given by sum-
mons49 served by the office of the student Attorney General.5" The
summons must be in writing and must specify, inter alia, the na-
ture of the offense.5 At a preliminary conference with the Attorney
General, the student is further informed of the charges against
him, the possible penalties, and his rights in relation to the hearing.
52
As a final guarantee of due notice, the student may move to post-
pone the hearing on the ground that he "has not been fully in-
formed of the particulars of the charge and is unable to adequately
defend himself .. .
Further provisions establish the right of the accused student to
a fair hearing-a right frequently denied by other academic institu-
tions. 4 The hearing is held by a council composed of the student's
peers, elected under campus geographical apportionment as specified
component institutions of the University of North Carolina shall
be included the duty to exercise full and final authority in the regu-
lation of student conduct and in all matters of student discipline
in that institution; and in the discharge of this duty, delegation of
such authority may be made to established agencies of student gov-
ernment and to administrative or other officers of the institution
in such manner and to such extent as may by the faculty and Chan-
cellor be deemed necessary and expedient; provided that in the
discharge of this duty it shall be the duty of the faculty and Chancel-
lor to secure to every student the right of due process and fair
hearing, the presumption of innocence until found guilty, the right
to know the evidence and to face witnesses testifying against him,
and the right to such advice and assistance in his own defense as
may be allowable under the regulations of the institution as ap-
proved by the faculty and Chancellor. In those instances where the
denial of any of these procedural rights is alleged, it shall be the
duty of the President to review the proceedings.
Resolution, Executive Committee of Board of Trustees of the University
of North Carolina, April 15, 1957 (on file in the Consolidated University
Offices, Chapel Hill, N. C.).
"Hereinafter cited as "Procedures Bill." Copies of Procedures Bill
and U.N.C. STUDENT CosT. are available from Student Government At-
torney General, Chapel Hill, N.C.
See notes 48-53, 55-61, 63-66 infra.
,U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(c).
"Procedures Bill, art. III, § 2 (1962).
Procedures Bill, art. III, § 4 (1962).
"Ibid.
"Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1 (1962).
"Procedures Bill, art. VIII, § 3 (1962).
"See cases cited note 27 supra.
19641
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by the Student Legislature.55 The accused student is to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty56 and is granted the right to a
speedy hearing.57 The right to a fair trial- includes the right to
disqualify members of the judicial body from sitting in judgment
in the particular case.5" And, in cases involving multiple defend-
ants, the accused student has the right to a separate trial if he so
elects. 9
The right to assistance by a defense counsel is granted,"0 but
the counsel must come "from among those students under the juris-
diction of the specific judicial body in which the case arises." 1 The
right of the accused student to face his accuser is likewise provided
for, " and the right to question any testimony0 3 assures the privilege
of cross-examination. Moreover, the accused student is guaranteed
the right to summon material witnesses, 4 and any student refusing
to comply with his obligation to serve as such may be charged by
the Attorney General with refusing to accept his responsibility under
the Honor System.65
Despite these procedural safeguards in the University's system,
the need for judicial review endures. While the system itself seems
adequate, the possibility of error in the application of the system
remains. Where such error is alleged in cases of student discipline,
the courts should review the proceedings much as an appellate court
does those of a trial tribunal. Whether the Dixon model marks a
new trend in cases involving state-supported schools and whether
the requirements of procedural due process will be applied to private
11 U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 3(b), (c).
IaU.N.C. STUDENT CoNsT. art. II, § 7(a).
",Procedures Bill, art. X, § 1 (1962). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(h); Procedures Bill, art. IX, § 1
(1962).
" Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1(g); art. XII, § 2 (1962).
"'U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(d); Procedures Bill, art. IV, §
1(c) (1962).
61U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 7(d). Quaere whether an accused
student could constitutionally be denied counsel by a member of the bar if
he desired it? "It is advisable, although probably not mandatory, that, if
[the student] . . . requests the privilege of being represented by counsel
selected and employed by him, it be accorded him." Address by Ralph F.
Lesemann, National Conference of University Attorneys, Ann Arbor, Mich.,
April 17, 1961.
*" Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1(k) (1962).
"U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 7(g).
" U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. I, § 7(e); Procedures Bill, art. XI § 7
(1962).
"Procedures Bill, art. XI, § 7 (1962).
(Vol. 43
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institutions remain to be seen. Whatever the trend in the rest of
the country, In re Carter indicates that the North Carolina courts
stand ready to remedy any deprivation of due process in the appli-
cation of the student disciplinary system of the University."0 As
to defects in the system itself, the courts are unlikely fo insist that
the University establish a microcosm of the common law. They
may nevertheless find that the present system in the University lacks
some fundamentals of due process to which the student is entitled.17
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARIJ
Constitutional Law-Extension of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
The petitioner in Malloy v. Hogan was on probation from a
sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a gambling charge. He
was brought before a referee conducting an inquiry into alleged
gambling activity in Connecticut and asked questions about the cir-
cumstances surrounding his prior arrest, among which were:
(1) for whom did he work on September 11, 1959; (2) who.
selected and paid his counsel in connection with his arrest on that
date and subsequent conviction; (3) who selected and paid his
bondsman; (4) who paid his fine'; (5) what was the name of
the tenant in the apartment in which he was arrested; and (6), -
did he know John Bergoti.
2
After refusing to answer each question "on the grounds it may
tend to incriminate me," he was adjudged in contempt3 and im-
prisoned until he would cooperate. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment granted a privilege against self-incrimination.' A lower
state court denied the writ, and the highest state court affirmea.b
"For example, deprivation of due process may. result as in Carter, where
the trial judge found the conviction based upon evidence insufficient to rebut
the presumption of innocence.
"'For example, the courts might find the denial of counsel- by a member
of the bar to deprive the student of due process. See note 61 supra.
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 12.
' The referee had the same power to commit a witness for contempt as
a judge of superior court. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52434 (Sipp. 1963)-. " ,
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, provides: "No person . . ., shall be' compelld
ih any criminal case to be a witness against himself . .. 2. See generjiy
Claflin, The Self-Incrimination Clause, 42 A.BA.J. 935 (1956).
'Malloy v. Hogan, 187 A.2d 744% (cGnn': 1963).," .
19641
